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SUMMARY:

Whether regulations issued by the Federal Home

Loan Bank Board (the "Board"), pursuant to the Homeowner's Loan
Act of 1933, 12

u.s.c.

§1461, et

~·

(the "Act"), preempt state

-:::::::

restrictions on enforcement of "due on sale" clauses in mortgages
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~ Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages.
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2. FACTS:

In 1976, the Board adopted the following

regu l ation:
"A federal association continues to have the
power t o- include, as a matter of contract between
it and the borrower, a provision in its loan
instruments w~eby the assoc1 ation may, at its
option, d ~ immedia~ e1y due and payable all
of the sums secured by t he assoc i a ti on's security
instrument !! all or any part of the ~eal
property secur1ng the loan i s sold or transferred
by tBe r>orrower without the associ at i on ' s prior
written consent." 41 Fed. Reg. 18288 {1976),
codified at 12 C.F.R. 545.8-3{f).
Appts are a Federal Savings & Loan Association chartered by
the Board, pursuant to§ 5{a) of the Act, and its wholly-owned
subsidiary.

Appees are each purchasers of real property which by

Deed of Trust secures a loan made earlier by appt to the
transferors of that property.

Each of the transferors sold their

property without appts' prior written consent, even though each
Deed of Trust includes a clause which provides that if the real
property is t r ansferred without that consent, Fidelity Federal
may call the loan due {a "due on sale" clause) •

Appts exercised

their option to declare the balance due and, when the balance was
not paid, instituted foreclosure proceedings.
Appees sought to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings in state
court. 2 They argued· that enforcement of the due on sale clauses

1This case should be considered along with Nos. 81-922,
81-992 and 81-993. All of these cases raise the same issue.
Please read this memo first.
2Three separate actions were filed1 the cases were
consolidated before entry of judgment in the trial court, and
treated as one case in the appellate court.
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violated California Civil Code §711, which .forbids unreasonable
restraints on the alienation of real property.

The trial court

granted appts' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the
state statute was preempted by the federal act and regulations.
3.

DECISION BELOWi

reversed. 3

The California Appellate Court

California law does not permit enforcement of a due

on sale clause "unless the lender can demonstrate that
enforcement is reasonably necessary to protect against impairment
to its security or the risk of default."
America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 953 (1978).

Wellenkamp v. Bank of

~idelity

Federal did not

claim such an impairment or a risk of default as a result of the
sales in question.

Therefore, the due on sale clauses could not

be enforced -- unless, of course, California law is preempted.
There are at least three parts to the court's preemption
analysis.

First, nothing in the Act demonstrates a clear

congressional mandate that federal rather than state law shall
control here.

The Act itself makes no reference to the subject

of due on sale clauses.

Second, the "occupation of the field"

doctrine is not applicable here.
authority to

r~gula~

Although the Board has plenary

and control federal savings and loan

associations, no one suggests that it was the intent of Congress
to supplant all state laws pertaining to real property and
mortgages.

Federal Savings & Loan Associations have always used

3The Appellate Court adopted in large measure an op1n1on
by the Court of Appeal for the First App. Dist. in Panko v. Pan
American Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. Panko is No. 81-922 and
is straight-lined with this case.

-4and been governed by state real property and mortgage laws in
respect to numerous matters

~.~.,

title, conveyancing,

recording, priority of liens, and proceedings for foreclosure}.
When the federal government "occupies a field," however, no state
law pertaining to the "field" is applicable.

Third, although the

Board has manifested its intention that state regulation of due
on sale clauses be preempted, federal and state regulations in
this case are not wholly conflicting and the mere expression of
intent by the Board is not sufficient to preempt state law. 4

The

federal regulation merely authorizes federal savings and loan
associations to include a due on sale clause in their loan
contracts; it does not compel their use or enforcement.
California law permits enforcement of such a clause only upon a
showing that the lender's security may be at risk as a
consequence of the transfer.

Thus, it is not physically

impossible for a federal association to comply with the two
regulatory schemes.
The court also noted that the following provision was
included in two of the three Deeds of Trust:

-----------

"This Deed of Trust

shall be governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the
property is located." 5

In its view this clause meant that state

4 rn the preamble to the regulation, 12 c.F.R. ~
ll(f},
the Board stated that "it was and is the Board's intention to
have • • • due on sale practices of federal associations governed
exclusively by federal law. • • • Federal associations shall not
be bound by or subject to any conflicting state law which imposes
different • • • due on sale requirements."
Footnote(s} 5 will appear on following pages.
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law was to govern the interpretation, validity and enforcement of
the loan security instrument.

This includes the limitation on

enforcement of due on sale provisions.

It rejected the argument

of FHLMC, which had appeared as an amicus, that state law
includes all federal law the state is required to enforce by
preemption or otherwise.
The California Supreme Court denied review.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Appts note that there are hundreds of

similar cases pending in the California courts against other
federal associations.

The California court's holding will have a

substantial effect on the ability of the Board to assure the
stability of the federal savings and loan system, as well as on
the secondary mortgage market.

On the substantive question,

appts begin with the proposition that federal regulations preempt
state law when their preemptive intent is clear and the
regulations are not inconsistent with federal law under which
they are promulgated.
151 (1978).

~

v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.

The federal regulation at issue here was fashioned

by the Board with the express intent of preempting state laws.
The Board's regulation is entirely consistent with the Act's
purpose of creating and maintaining an economically viable
federal savings and loan system:

The Board has concluded that

the ability of a federal association to exercise a due on sale

5This is a uniform prov1s1on used in the form instruments
promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
("FHLMC"), use of which is a precondition to the purchase of a
mortgage by FHLMC.
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clause at the lender's option is necessary to the stability of
the federal savings and loan system.

The state court avoided

finding a direct conflict by distinguishing between permissive
and mandatory provisions.

This distinction is not persuasive

because the state law flatly precludes that which the federal law
embraces.

Other courts have found preemption in situations

involving "permissive" federal regulations.

See Meyers v.

Beverly Hills Federal Saving & Loan Ass'n, 499 F.2d 1145 {CA 9
1974) {involving prepayment penalties for early repayment of
mortgage loans).

Moreover, in Conference of Federal Savings &

Loan Associations v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256 {CA 9 1979), aff'd, 445

u.s.

921 {1980), the CA 9 held that the Act was a comprehensive

regulatory scheme intended by Congress to preempt all state laws
which sought in any way to regulate or control the operation of
federal savings and loan associations:

"The broad regulatory

authority over the federal associations conferred upon the Bank
Board by HOLA does wholly preempt the field of regulatory control
over these associations."
affirmed that decision.

Id. at 1260.

This Court summarily

In contrast, the California court

distinguished the "internal" and "external" activities of federal
associations and held that while the Board has complete authority
to regulate the internal affairs of federal associations, it does
not have such authority over its external affairs.

Appts point

. out that numerous courts have upheld the preemptive power of
federal regulations dealing with aspects of the lender/borrower
relationship.

Finally, appts contend that the "law of the

jurisdiction clause in the Deed of Trust did not preclude a

-7finding of preemption because the law of the state necessarily
includes preemptive federal law."

See Hauenstein v. Lynhan, 100

u.s. 483 (1880}.6
Appees primarily adopt the argument of the California court.
The state has not attempted to regulate federal

associations~

rather, Cal. Civil Code §711 is a substantive rule of real
property, which incidently infringes upon the federal
associations' transactions.

There is ample room, whatever the

Board's authority, for continued state regulation of real
property.

Moreover, under the federal regulation it would be

permissible for any and all federal associations to contract to
enforce the due on sale clause only when a transfer impairs their
security:

a state law which achieves the same result does not

conflict with the Act.

Finally, this Court need not reach the

issue of whether Civil Code § 711 conflicts with the federal
regulation, because two of the deeds of trust were executed prior
to the effective date of the regulation (July 31, 1976}, and the
judgment with respect to the third transaction rests on an
adequate nonfederal basis

the contractual "law of the

jurisdiction" clause.7
Appts reply to this final argument, as follows.

Whether a

federal lender by contract has waived a federal right is a

6Appts contend that the California court incorrectly
believed this clause to be in two of the deeds, when it was only
in one.
7Appees also suggest that this last argument justifies
this Court's dismissal of the case.
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question of federal, not state law.

Moreover, the California

courts' discussion of this issue is only dicta:

It was

unnecessary to reach the issue after holding that the federal
regulations were not preemptive.

With respect to the deeds

executed before the 1976 effective date of the regulation, appts
reply that the regulation "merely codified what had been
consistently the policy and position of the Bank Board."

The

regulation itself starts with the phrase "An association
continues to have the power to include .

"

The SG has filed an amicus brief for the Board.

The Board

contends that the decision below will seriously impair the
federal government's efforts to control federal savings and loan
associations' mortgage rates.

Insofar as the California court's

decision rests on the view that the Board's authority is limited
to regulating the internal affairs of savings and loan
associations, it conflicts with numerous decisions which have
upheld the Board's pervasive regulatory control.

See,~-~·,

Stein, supra (reporting and notice requirements regarding
possible discriminatory lending

practices)~

First Federal Savings

& Loan Ass'n of Boston v. Greenwald, 591 F.2d 417 (CA 1 1979)

(payment of interest on escrow

accounts)~

Kupiec v. Republic

Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 512 F.2d 147, 150 (CA 7 1975)
(methods of supplying notice to Association

members)~

Kaski v.

"First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Madison, 240 N.W . 2d 367
(Wis. 1976)

(prepayment penal ties) •

-

----

The CA 5, however, has also

concluded that the Board's power is limited to controlling
internal affairs of federal associations.

Gulf Federal Savings &

-9-

Loan Ass'n of Jefferson Parish v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
651 F.2d 259, 266 (1981).

He also challenges the California

courts' suggestion that a different standard of preemption
applies when a federal administrative agency is the source of a
federal rule, as opposed to an Act of Congress directly.

This

Court has long-recognized that an administrative regulation which
properly implements a statute has the identical preemptive
effect.

See Free v. Bland, 369

u.s.

663, 668 (1962).

Appees have filed a reply to the Board's brief which notes
that legislation is pending which addresses the issue involved in
this case.

These bills, S.l720 and S.l703, would provide for

federal preemption of any state law prohibiting enforcement of
the due on sale clause.

Since passage of this legislation would

moot this case, appees contend that the Court should dismiss or
affirm without a hearing.
5.

u.s.c.

DISCUSSION:

This appears to be a proper appeal under 28

§1257(2); appts expressly raised the constitutional

validity of Civil Code §711 and the California court upheld the
state provision in the fact of this preemption claim.

There is

little reason to question appts' and the Board's contention that
the California decision will have a drastic effect on the
availability of mortgages from federal savings and loan
· associations and on the secondary market in mortgages.

Due on

sale clauses shorten the average life of a conventional mortgage
and thus permit lenders to increase the interest they can charge
on long-term loan commitments during periods of rising interest
rates.

On the merits, both of the distinctions that stand behind

-10-

the California court's opinion -- that between the internal and
external affairs of the association and that between preemption
by statute and by federal regulation -- are not very persuasive.
As appts and the SG point out, numerous courts have upheld the
authority of the Board to regulate the relationship between
federal savings and loan associations and their borrowers.
Federal regulations, consistent with their authorizing statutes,
are just as capable of preempting state laws as are the statutes
themselves.

Nor do I think the state court is very convincing in

its claim that the state effort to prohibit what the federal law
permits does not directly conflict with the federal regulation.
I recommend that the Court note probable jurisdiction.
There is a motion to affirm or dismiss, a reply brief, two
amicus briefs (one filed by the SG and one by the California
Secretary of Business Transportation and Housing), and a reply to
the SG's brief.
January 13, 1982
ME

Kahn
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